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NETWORKS OF CONNECTIVITY, TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW POLITICS OF CITY REGIONALISM
"To govern it is necessary to render the visible space over which government is to be exercised. And this is not simply a matter of looking: space has to be represented, marked out." (Thrift, 2002: 205) "The issue is not how and whether to draw lines around regions but to seek to understand the process through which they are (re-)produced." (Hudson, 2007 (Hudson, : 1155 
INTRODUCTION
Through most of the twentieth century national economies were described in regional terms to inform policy needs that were essentially territorialist in nature: in Castells' (1996) thinking this was the national economy as a 'space of places'. In the United Kingdom this culminated in the Labour Government's programme of Devolution and Constitutional Change (1997-1999) , which saw the establishment of a new parliament in Scotland, elected assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland, an assembly with elected mayor in London, and (to work alongside Government Offices for the Regions) regional development agencies (RDA) and indirectly-elected regional assemblies in each of the eight English regions. To many keen observers, this signalled the UK Government's intent to reverse the trend of centralisation and embrace the popular belief that political-economic dividends could be secured by devolving state power to elected regional bodies. That is everywhere except
England.
In part a reflection of the logic that has seen regions reified as active agents in wealth creation, but more directly a distinct lack of civic regionalism, England has remained the only country of the UK not to be in receipt of additional elected political representation, and by implication, new institutional spaces through which to secure the promise of increased accountability and participatory democracy under devolution. This is not to say that attempts have not been made. In 2002, for instance, the UK Government presented the English regions with the opportunity to establish directly-elected regional assemblies (ERA) -a proposal rejected by a significant majority of voters in the first and only referendum held on 4 November 2004 in North East England. Other solutions afforded a political hearing include calls for an English Parliament, English votes on English laws, English independence, strengthened local government, elected mayors, a return to ERAs sometime in the future, regional ministers, and city-regions (Hazell, 2006) .
Of these it is noteworthy how city-regions and city-regional thinking have become central to recent political praxis in England. First, the rhetoric surrounding city-regions is explicitly couched in a language extolling the virtues of competitiveness, and, as a result, city-regions were the only solution not to focus on providing a potential solution to the missing politics of regionalism in England (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2003 Minister, , 2004 . Second, the focus on city-regions reflects moves away from thinking the UK economy as a 'space of places' towards 'spaces of flows' approaches that privilege cities (as key nodes) in the space economy (Castells, 1996; Scott, 2001a/b; Taylor and Knox, 1995) . Third, city-regions are seen to support calls from academics advocating 'thinking space relationally', for whom emergent spatial configurations are not necessarily territorial and scalar but constituted through the spatiality of flow, porosity, and connectivity Cochrane, 2007, 2010 ; Allen et al., 1998; Amin, 2004; Amin et al., 2003; Massey, 2004 Massey, , 2007 . And fourth, the centrality of city-regions to recent political praxis means that the map of the UK space economy is no longer simply divided into administrative regions, but records the emergence of 'new' relationally networked spaces, some of which cut across the territorial map that prevailed through the twentieth century.
All of which intensifies the urgent need to further explore the ongoing transformation of economic governance within capitalist states. But it also prompts the need to confront searching questions regarding the production and reproduction of these 'new state spaces' (Brenner, 2004; MacLeavy and Harrison, 2010) . For despite a rich and varied literature on city-regions and city-centric capitalism, the city-region remains an 'object of mystery' (Harrison, 2007 and Regional Research, 2007) , work on the latter remains preoccupied with the increased visibility of city-regions within political discourse -often framed as part of a wider neoliberal agenda (Harding, 2007) . What is missing is due consideration of the political-economic struggle to spatially define, delimit and designate city-regions.
Here city-regions are all too often scripted unreflectively, with little regard for how they have been historically constructed, culturally contested and politically charged.
Noting that this is not an attempt to develop, as many have, a 'typical' (or worse, an 'ideal') model for city-regions, this paper aims to explore these tensions through an examination of recent endeavours to construct a spatial map of city-regions in the north of England. where struggles to construct a spatial map of city-regions has exacerbated the already strikingly uneven geographies of the UK following the devolution of powers, authority and legitimacy to regional institutions at the end of the twentieth century.
Throughout the discussion in sections three and four, the aim is to demonstrate how the processes by which city-regions are represented and marked out are the outcome of both relational economic processes and political claims to territory. The final section relates these findings to ongoing debates around state, space and scalar geographies, and speculates what they might mean for the future of city-regional debate.
THE NEW CITY-REGIONALISM

New economics of city-regions, new politics of city-regionalism
Albeit enjoying a rich scientific history, the concept of the city-region has been rejuvenated as part of a wider 'new regionalist' literature documenting the importance of place-based and site-specific nodes of dense economic, social, and political activity within a globalizing world (Amin and Thrift, 1992; Scott, 2001a) .
Seen to have a 'deepening role' in the economy as places where globalization crystallises out on the ground (Scott, 2001b) , city-regions are trumpeted as 'windows of locational opportunity' for capturing, nurturing, and anchoring wealth creating activity (Scott and Storper, 2003) . Alongside this, claims that capitalist economies are best regulated and governed in and through the decentralisation of socioeconomic decision-making and policy implementation to city-regional institutions, frameworks and supports has rendered the task of devising city-regional policies an officially institutionalised task through North America, Western Europe, but large parts of Pacific Asia and Latin America also (Herrschel and Newman, 2002; OECD, 2007; Segbers, 2007; Simmonds and Hack, 2000; Zhao and Zhang, 2007) .
Despite the centrality of the city-region to modern-day accounts of economic success, those seeking to engage with these claims have been quick to highlight the need to consider several important issues. These include: the continued significance of national state power in city-region development (Harrison, 2007; McGuirk, 2007) ;
connections between the economic geographies of cities and regional economic development (Deas and Ward, 2000) ; the conflict between securing economic competitiveness and managing the everyday politics of collective consumption and social reproduction in city-regions (Donald, 2001; Jonas and Ward, 2007a) ; the link between city-regions and the politics and outcomes of uneven development (Etherington and Jones, 2008) ; the dangers of policy transfer and policy imitation (Harrison, 2007; MacLeod, 2001; Ward and Jonas, 2004) ; and, questions around democracy (Purcell, 2007) , governance (Brenner, 2002; Harrison, 2008; Leibovitz, 2003) and spatial planning (Goodchild and Hickman, 2005; Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill, 2000) . All issues that could be usefully grouped as relating to the politicaleconomy of city-regions, most recently these concerns have been voiced in a special debates forum on city-regions.
Expressing concern at how discourses pertaining to a new city-regionalism are being constructed around a narrow set of empirical and theoretical issues relating to exchange, interspatial competition, and globalization -the new economics of city-regions -Andrew Jonas and Kevin Ward (2007a) denote how there has been a tendency to reify the city-region as an agent of wealth creation and redistribution. Overlooking how city-regions are 'constructed politically', this myopia heightens intellectual urgency around the need to conceptualise the (re-)emergence of city-regions as the "product of a particular set of economic, cultural, environmental and political projects, each with their own logics … to discover for which interests city-regions are necessary and for whom this new territoriality is merely contingent" (p. 176). Not surprisingly, this claim sparked a flurry of research aimed at developing a new politics of city-regionalism (Jarvis, 2007; Krueger and Savage, 2007; McCann, 2007; McGuirk, 2007; Purcell, 2007) . However, this broader, more political vision has not been welcomed by all. Alan Harding (2007) , for instance, argues that for city-regions to be taken seriously there needs to be 'considerably more economics' in the political-economy of city-regions, while doubts persist more generally about the debilitating effect that a polarisation of the political and economic can and will have on advancing city-regional debate.
Despite recent interventions doing much to raise awareness of how cityregions are being constructed politically, the processes by which city-regions are rendered a visible space are largely ignored. Here the lack of a commonly accepted definition for the city region is indicative of a debate beset by confusion. Wherever you look in the literature a different set of criteria is used to define the city-region.
Tewdwr- Jones and McNeill (2000: 131) , for instance, define the city-region as "a strategic and political level of administration and policy-making, extending beyond the administrative boundaries of single urban local government authorities to include urban and/or semi-urban hinterlands". For Scott (2001b: 814) proponents the city-region is a 'fuzzy' concept (cf. Markusen, 1999 ).
What appears as the key point in most definitions though is this focus on the 'reach' or 'footprint' of cities. A recognition that gives credence to those advancing 'spaces of flows' approaches, it is somewhat surprising then that the spatial grammar associated with relational thinking is omitted from calls to conceptualise city-regions as the product of both economic and political projects (Jonas and Ward, 2007a ). Of note is how key terms such as connectivity, flow, porosity, proximity, relational, and topology are deployed sparingly in the debates forum while reference to (and derivatives of) territory and scale are found in abundance. All of which might suggest that the spatial grammar associated with 'thinking space relationally' relates more appropriately to economic flows (the economics of city-regions) than it does to acts of political mobilization (the politics of city-regionalism)?
Conceptualising city-regions: both networked and territorial
The suggestion that spatial configurations are constituted through the spatiality of flow, porosity and relational connectivity has prompted, amongst others, Ash Amin (2004: 36) to theorize how in a relationally constituted world capital accumulation and governance is "increasingly about exercising nodal power and aligning networks at large in one's own interest, rather than about exercising territorial power… [for] there is no definable regional territory to rule over". A focus on actors, institutional structures and their interactive power relations has seen relational approaches decentre and destabilise spatial and scalar categories (such as the state, city, and region) and led to claims that human geographers should abandon notions of scale altogether (Marston et al., 2005) . While these authors are inclined to jettison territorial and scalar approaches, others contend that relational/topological and territorial/scalar approaches should be seen as both/and rather than either/or conceptions (Hudson, 2007) . Here the degree to which one interprets cities or regions as territorial and scalar or topological and networked
"remains an open question: a matter to be resolved ex post and empirically rather than a priori and theoretically" (MacLeod and Jones, 2007: 1186) . From this perspective, relational approaches are seen to be at their most convincing when focusing on the spatiality of cross-border economic flows and interchange, but 'bend the stick too far' when it comes to acts of political mobilisation, which are often 'territorially articulated' (Jones and MacLeod, 2004) . Points that lead Martin Jones and Gordon MacLeod (2004) to usefully distinguish between 'new regional spaces'
and 'new spaces of regionalism' -the former referring to the production of regional difference by economic processes, the latter to processes of political mobilization around notions of regional difference.
Today, a standoff exists between those who remain steadfast in their view that the spatial grammar of flows and networks is equally applicable to issues of politics as they are economics (Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Amin et al., 2003; Massey, 2005 Massey, , 2007 and those calling for a retention of territorially oriented readings of political economy and when appropriate their conjoining with non-territorial, relational, and topological approaches (Hudson, 2007; Jessop et al., 2008; Jones and Jessop, 2010; MacLeod and Jones, 2007; Morgan, 2007) . Noticeable, however, is that these entrenched positions are already the subject of some refinement in response to the emergence of new city-regional spaces and the relational language of network and flow that has accompanied them. John Allen Cochrane (2007: 1163) argue, for instance, that the reinvented 'regional' politics of south east England exposes how "the governance of regions, and its spatiality, now works through a looser, more negotiable, set of political arrangements that take their shape from the networks of relations that stretch across and beyond given regional boundaries", thus calling into question the usefulness of representing regions politically as territorially fixed "in any essential sense". However, Kevin Morgan's insightful observations on the UK's emerging 'polycentric state' suggest different:
"To overcome the debilitating binary division between territorial and relational geography one needs to recognize that political space is bounded and porous: bounded because politicians are held to account through the territorially defined ballot box, a prosaic but important reason why one should not be so dismissive of territorial politics; porous because people have multiple identities and they are becoming ever more mobile, spawning communities of relational connectivity that transcend territorial boundaries." Morgan (2007: 33 original emphasis) With so much intellectual energy being invested in attempts to capture the political-economic processes responsible for the (re)production of new state spaces, it is at best surprising, at worst alarming, that for the most part these endeavours are overlooked by those proclaiming intellectual urgency around the need to conceptualise the (re-)emergence of city-regions as the product of both economic and political projects. This paper seeks to open up city-regional debate by engaging
with these debates to demonstrate how the processes by which city-regions are made visible are the outcome of both relational economic processes and political claims to territory.
The discussion in the remainder of the article explores the re-emergence of city-regions in the north of England. More specifically, it seeks to identify the processes by which the city-regions have been made visible and marked out. The analysis presented is based on insights from interviews conducted between 2004-2008 with over 75 national and regional stakeholders. Interviewees ranged from government ministers to councillors, senior executives to mid-ranking and junior practitioners, and included representatives from both public and private sector bodies, and with the exception of two, all interviews were recorded, fully transcribed and coded. Quotes are used to capture the key points of concern expressed.
REDRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE UK SPACE ECONOMY
Through most of the twentieth century the UK space economy was defined in regional terms to inform policy needs that were essentially territorialist in nature.
But despite their long history, the boundaries of administrative regions have limited meaning for most people in England. At no point was this more poignantly conveyed than in the events surrounding the rejection of a directly-elected regional assembly in North East England. A region with high levels of civic regionalism and de facto home of English regionalism, the North East was seen to be a 'safe bet' to hold the first referendum -opinion polls suggested 72% of the electorate supported the creation of an ERA (BBC, 2002 ). Yet the outcome was 78% of voters rejected the proposal. According to Rallings and Thrasher (2006: 934 Most obvious is the shift from 'regions' to 'city-regions'. However, a number of more subtle shifts are also apparent in the UK Government's policy rhetoric.
Where the talk in 2004 is around the politics and economics of regions, the equivalent extract from 2006 talks solely about the economics of city-regions.
Second, the 2006 extract is couched in language associated with flows, networks, and relational connectivity (joining up business hubs, proximity, expanding existing markets) whereas the language in 2004 is more territorial, even hierarchical, with its focus on regional economic disparities, targets, funding, central guidance, and stronger accountability. And third, a more subtle shift sees the state's perspective change from a top-down focus -how the state can better regulate regions -to a less authoritarian approach focused on giving cities the conditions necessary to drive regional and national economic growth.
Triggered partly by the collapse of English regional policy, but more by the changing geography of the UK economy in the most recent round of global restructuring, this marked change to the political rhetoric was supported by new policy measures (Harrison, 2009 Second, is the identification of eight city-regions as key nodes in the space economy.
And third is the recognition that the lines on the map do not identify political and administrative boundaries, but important flows (in this case the major rail and road routes, along with their tributaries). All of which means that, for the first time, the UK space economy is not only being discussed in relational terms, but the spatial map of the economy is represented and defined as a relationally networked 'space of flows'.
This vision is also reflected in the strategies developed by the NWSG to meet their ambitious aim: "We are seeking nothing less than the transformation of the and a Northern Leadership Academy, alongside pan-northern projects in chemicals, energy, engineering, food and drink, finance and professional services, housing, logistics, skills, and sustainability. Each city-region also has its own City Region Development Programme (CRDP), which outlines how it will contribute to unlocking the potential for faster economic growth. The emphasis on openness, flows, and connectivity can be seen in the distinct 'taglines' that have been adopted by each city-region. Illustrative of this is Leeds aiming to "improve city regional, pan-regional and international connectivity" and the Hull and Humber Ports advertising as "a global gateway". Finally, the initial £100 million Northern Way Growth Fund provided by the UK Government and RDAs is unlike previous regional funding in that it does not spatially redistribute investment through local area-based initiatives, but concentrates on improving connections and collaboration between city-regions and internationally, to work smarter together and make bigger impacts, stimulate new government capacity, and identify opportunities to market the North of England. ). This is due, in large part, to the role played by the three northern RDA in orchestrating the Northern Way.
Established in 1999 as the centrepiece of England's devolution settlement, RDAs are tasked with making the English regions 'more competitive', whilst spreading economic prosperity and opportunity to everyone (Department for Environment, Transport and Regions, 1997). To do this each RDA has responsibility for developing their regions' economic strategy -a visionary document which outlines specific regional priorities for driving economic growth over a fifteen to twenty year period, whilst ensuring the needs and opportunities of everyone in the region are met. Furthermore, the RDA are shortly to take over responsibility (from the indirectly-elected Regional Assemblies) for developing their regions' spatial strategy -a predominantly planning document that provides a broad development strategy for the same fifteen to twenty year period and focuses on infrastructure and land use activities. Thus the spatial coverage of the strategy, and by implication the day-to-day activities of RDAs, is defined by, and limited to, the politicaladministrative boundary of each region. What is particularly interesting about the Northern Way, and the role of RDAs therein, is that it combines policies for spatial and economic development within the three north of England regions. It is a recognition that while much planning activity remains best conceived at regional or local level, in many areas it requires joined-up thinking across regional boundaries.
As Allmendinger and Haughton (2009) have recently noted, planners increasingly
have (to learn) to work within these 'soft spaces' of governance -that is increasingly complex multilayered, fluid, and sometimes fuzzy scales of policy and governance arrangements. For RDAs this poses a major challenge: how best to manage their responsibility for developing economic and spatial strategies and effective regional and subregional partnerships based on territorially defined political-administrative boundaries whilst at the same driving forward new networked governance arrangements that stretch across and beyond regional boundaries? But as one interviewee explained, it also poses a major challenge for those (including RDAs) responsible for producing and implementing CRDPs:
"I think that one of the acid tests of the integration of economic development and spatial development will be how effective those CRDPs are, because not only will they need to feed into the Regional Economic Strategy process, they will also have to feed into the Regional Spatial Strategy process." [Senior Policy Official, Government Office North West] What I want to argue here is that there are two distinct cuts to this, whereby it is necessary to examine the processes by which city-regions are produced (specifically how they are made visible and marked out) both across and within regions. The next section explores each in turn to reveal how each cut offers a different take on the political and economic logic for city-regions, but also to offer some remarks regarding the conceptualisation of state space as relational, networked, and topological, as well as, or instead of, territorial and scalar.
THE NORTHERN WAY AS COMPROMISED CITY-REGIONALISM
Recent work completed for the UK government identifies five different approaches to the definition of city-regions: labour-market definitions (travel to work); housing-market definitions (the area in which households search for residential locations); economic activity-based definitions (business linkages, supply chains); service-district definitions (users of city-based goods and services); and, administrative definitions (formal but 'artificial' functional areas for delivering public services) (ODPM, 2006) . The problem, as the authors of the report conclude, is that while there are these various definitions they are not mutually consistent and none are easily translatable into clear, hard and unambiguous lines on maps. As one well placed interviewee explained, any attempt to mark out a city-region thus requires compromise:
"We have promoted this concept of fuzzy boundaries -the idea that it is an economic concept and not an administrative one -because by its very nature you can't always draw a boundary around an economic concept. It is a matter of degree and you get different city-region boundaries in the labour markets than if you looked at business supply linkages or urban density. So there is no one answer to that. Now they face, like we all do, they compromise sometimes because a city-region is an economic structure and sometimes you do actually have to draw boundaries and give people responsibility. So I suppose the economic strategy may talk about city-regions, but sometimes in the delivery of projects you have to draw a boundary. Even in London you don't have a mayor that covers the whole London city-region otherwise they would be running most of the south east. representing no more than a partial take on the processes involved in the production of city-regions. Exploring each cut in turn, this section examines how the privileging of networks in accounts documenting a new city-regionalism has resulted in a tendency to underplay the role of territory in shaping the geography of city-regions.
Connecting cities across regions
There is compelling evidence to suggest that new and emerging spatial configurations such as the Northern Way are constituted through the spatiality of flow, porosity, and connectivity. However, even when we look across regions, there is evidence to suggest that the territorial mosaic of regional political-administrative units is responsible for a compromised city-regionalism in England. Furthermore, the move from a growth corridor to city-regions is important because it changed the spatial focus from a growth corridor across regions to cityregions within regions.
Connected cities, fragmented regions
Operating across parts of three of the UK's best performing regions -South Yet the degree to which one sees the Northern Way as evidence for relational thinking to replace territorial and scalar approaches is markedly different to that which Allen and Cochrane surmise from their study. First, the status of south east
England as a polycentric global mega-city region makes the regional boundaries appear more open and porous given its proximity and long-established networks into the internationalising economy through the City of London, and its political ties to
Westminster and Whitehall (Pain, 2008) . As Jones and MacLeod (2004) All points which confirm that despite regional boundaries disappearing from the pan-regional spatial map of the Northern Way, and compelling evidence that spatial configurations are constituted through the spatiality of flow, city-regions are unable to escape the existing territorial mosaic of regional and subregional politicaladministrative units and boundaries. This is given further weight by the recognition that in the North West, like other regions, areas fall between or on the fringes of city-regions. Seen to be fulfilling their task of making the English regions more competitive, the commitment of RDAs to spreading economic prosperity and opportunity to everyone is putting them under increasing pressure as they become more 'spatially selective' in prioritising city-regions as areas for regional investment (Jones, 1997) .
Fragmented regions
Affording Manchester and Liverpool city-region status was straightforwardboth are represented in the Core Cities group and located in the main east-west growth corridor. Where tension emerged was that Central Lancashire and Cumbria also claimed city-region status, despite both having: (i) a very contained and insular economy with limited engagement in the international economy; (ii) a weak urban core; (iii) a location outside either growth corridor; (iv) no representation in the Core Cities group; and (iv) no historical claim to being a city-region. In their favour, both areas were located in a third major growth corridor connecting (from north to south) Glasgow/Edinburgh, Manchester/Liverpool, Birmingham and London. From this it is perhaps surprising that one area, Central Lancashire, was afforded city-region status, while the other, Cumbria, was not. But this overlooks one key determining factor.
For the decision to identify a Central Lancashire city-region came about because it contributes 20% of the North West's total economic output (measured as Gross
Value Added) compared to Cumbria's 6%.
Reaffirming the premise that city-regions are an essentially economic proposition, this decision re-opened debates over the 'spatial selectivity' of the state in privileging (and de-privileging) certain areas and spaces (Jones, 1997 Second, the case study of the Northern Way is particularly useful in demonstrating that while city-regions are designated and initially defined according to economic logic, the process by which they are made visible is the result of a compromised city-regionalism. In particular, the case study of North West England demonstrates how, following the designation of three city-regions, the challenge to define, delimit and mark out these city-regions was constrained, first, by the political and administrative boundaries of the region, and second, by historically embedded and politically charged claims to territory. In so doing it demonstrates how, far from 'escaping' regulatory supervision by the state (Scott, 2001b) , the state retains a pivotal role (through RDAs) in centrally orchestrating the production of city-regions in England.
The North of England also offers a stark reminder that rescaling is not simply the privileging of one scale of governance (city-regions) over another (regions), but a complex, multilayered, and fluid process. Politically it is possible to suggest that although the defined scales of policy making in England -national, regional, localdo not conform to spaces of flows, they are too institutionally, culturally and historically fixed to be reformed -that is, unless the UK Government bites the political bullet and fundamentally reforms what is already there, something the Labour Government has so far proved unwilling to do. In this regard, the emergence of city-regions in England is, I suggest, a typical Labour endeavour with regards to governance -it adds to existing arrangements rather than reforms them iv . The result is new governance arrangements sit alongside elected government, which, as one planning official told me, is leading to more and more confusion:
"I can't really get a handle on CRDPs because they do not appear to have any statutory status. We might also say, following Markusen (1999) , that 'city region' remains a fuzzy concept, and perhaps politically it is intentionally so. Its hallmark in UK politics is that it is neither here nor there; it is not central state, nor is it directly associated with the ongoing debate about the merits of regions or localism.
All of which contributes to growing confusion over the city-region in theory and practice. But as this paper has uncovered, as a confluence of powerful intellectual, social, economic and political forces, city-regions remain a crucible to provide fresh insights into how new spaces of governance are being produced in globalization, and more importantly, how they interact and intersect with other scales of governance: a view that would seem to lend support to Allmendinger and Haughton's (2009: 626) contention that in future work:
"… it is important to examine how rescaling works across multiple scales, including emergent 'soft spaces' of governance, rather than simply privileging specific scales of governance. It is how the many scales of governance intersect and interact which matters, not simply the scales which are perceived to be the primary 'beneficiaries' or 'losers' in rescaling." 
